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THE ABC'S OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY-
WITH A CLOSE LOOK AT SECTION 402A AND THE CODE
REED DICKERSON*
I take as my text an old limerick:
An epicure dining at Crewe
Found quite a large mouse in his stew
Said the waiter, "Don't shout
And wave it about,
Or the rest will be wanting one, too!"
Although most epicures are not crying for mice, those who have
found mice in their stews have been increasingly crying for compensa-
tion. Indeed, products liability threatens to upstage the other forms
of personal injury liability.
I have been interested in this subject for 30 years but, every time I
think I understand it, it begins to fall apart on me. I know of no field
of the law where, in fairly simple fact situations, legal doctrine is so
subtly complicated. For example, there are 8 or 9 possible theories of
liability, and the matter of plaintiff's participation, alone, can be
approached in at least 5 ways. There are few fields that are changing
so fast; you could teach a respectable course in products liability with-
out referring to a case decided before 1960.
Unfortunately, trying to explain products. liability in the brief span
available is like trying to engrave the Lord's Prayer on the head of a
pin. I will do my best.
I am not going to try to tell you how to try a products liability
case; the tactics of offense and defense you can learn better elsewhere.
Instead, I want to talk about broad legal doctrine, which is basic to a
products case. Too many lawyers and writers underestimate the diffi-
culties of doctrine, and as a result too many judges are inadequately
educated by counsel.
What is "products liability"? Until recently at least, the term sug-
gested civil liability to an ultimate consumer for physical injury result-
ing from using a defective article that had been sold by a person in
the business of selling such articles. Although products doctrine is be-
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ginning to spill over these boundaries, its rationale has been, and still
is, a theory for protecting personal consumption. Thus, we may disre-
gard for the time being the fact that courts are beginning to extend
products liability doctrines from ultimate consumer to commercial con-
sumer and from consumer to bystander.
To understand products liability, we need a philosophy of consumer
protection seen against the background of modern technology and mer-
chandising. Modern products liability law proclaims the death of
caveat emptor and the economic background it once reflected: a mis-
cellany of sellers and buyers bargaining with each other in circum-
stances of relatively equal financial power and technical sophistication.
Compare the typical situation today: a relatively sophisticated and fi-
nancially powerful seller dealing with a relatively unsophisticated and
financially weak consumer respecting a complicated product whose
capacities for inflicting injury are often hidden, all in the context of a
highly complex system of merchandising and distribution. That such
a situation carries a high potential for exploitation poses the basic prob-
lem to which the law of products liability is addressed, and understand-
ing it is necessary to understanding the direction that sales law and
tort law are now taking. The key idea, then, is consumer vulnerability
to an unknown risk that is largely controllable by a sophisticated and
well-heeled professional.
In this context, a products liability suit may serve three different
purposes:
(1) It may compensate the plaintiff for his injury.
(2) Cumulatively with similar suits, it may help to induce manu-
facturers and other handlers to improve their operations.
(3) So far as a seller can increase prices to cover the costs of meet-
ing his civil responsibilities, it can provide a kind of industry
"do it yourself" insurance whereby consumers in general pay
the costs of compensating individual consumers for their in-
juries.
Examining how the courts have met the challenge of protecting the
consumer iith traditional legal weapons is a fascinating exercise.
What have been the available approaches? There are surprisingly
many. The approaches of fraud and deceit have not been particularly
fruitful, except in the relatively rare situations in which it has been
possible to prove the seller's knowledge.
Until recently, the traditional approach has been to use breach of
warranty, which is a form of strict liability, against the immediate
seller and, because of privity considerations, to use negligence against
more remote sellers. Negligence has rarely been successful against mere
distributors, unless their own operations have been implicated. On the
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other hand, it has been generally successful against the manufacturer
wherever the plaintiff could trace the offending condition back to the
defendant's plant.
For defects of design, it has been possible to try the traditional issue
of negligence. For defects resulting from manufacturing slips, on the
other hand, neither party has ordinarily been able to reconstruct what
actually happened to the particular product. Here the courts have
helped the plaintiff by making rather free applications of res ipsa
loquitur to develop either a presumption or a prima facie case. Many
have relaxed the requirement of defendant's control of the product to
help the plaintiff bridge some of the difficulties in finding direct proof
that the defect existed when the product left the defendant's plant. The
result has been that, in relying on mere proof of causation to establish
fault, the courts have in effect been applying a kind of strict liability
under the guise of "negligence." This approach persisted only because
the privity requirement continued to apply to warranty cases long after
it was relaxed for negligence cases by MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.1
Where proof of negligence has been a serious problem for the plain-
tiff, he has sometimes been helped by the doctrine of negligence per se,
but only if there was an applicable regulatory statute and if he could
show that it had been breached. In practice, the approach has offered
a significant advantage only where the statute does not require mens rea
and its breach is more than mere evidence of negligence. Current sta-
tutory controls of manufacture or labeling are largely confined to food
and drugs, flammable fabrics, hazardous substances, automobiles, refrig-
erators, cigarettes, insecticides, fireworks, bedding, upholstered furniture,
glass doors, plastic bags, electrical appliances, and space heaters.
A possible variant of the negligence per se approach was suggested
by Williams v. Paducah Coca-Cola Bottling Co.2 This seemed to say
that a seller of a statutorily regulated product impliedly warrants that
he has complied with -the statute. If so, there is an implied warranty
in addition to those provided by the Uniform Commercial Code. No
other case that I know of has taken this approach.
The traditional approach where privity considerations are not a
barrier has been that of implied warranty. This is a form of strict
liability, because it does not depend on showing that the defendant has
been careless. The two main implied warranties are those of mer-
chantability, which requires that a product perform as well as that
kind of product is generally supposed to, and of fitness for a particular
1. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2. 343 Ill. App. 1, 98 N.E.2d 164, 167 (1951).
1969]
TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
purpose, a custom-tailored obligation that requires that the product
meet the special need of a particular consumer who has communicated
that need to the seller and relied on him to meet it. Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, the consumer depends mainly on the warranty
of merchantability.
These warranties are rules of law relating to minimum standards of
quality that apply irrespective of whether they are actually implied in
the particular case. Although courts now tend to treat all breaches of
implied warranty involving personal injury as a form of tort, it is not
entirely clear what significance classification as "tort" or "contract"
should have in the states in which sales transactions are governed by
statute.
Another kind of warranty, which has apparently existed almost
from the time of the yearbooks, seems to be of little importance today.
This is the special warranty of wholesomeness that applies to a mer-
chant's sale of food. Although recognized in Swift & Co. v. Wells3 and
several earlier American cases, it offers no advantages not now provided
by more conventional warranties.
Possibly another approach to seller's liability for defective goods is
that expressed by section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, Second.
This provides that a commercial seller who sells a product in a defec-
tive condition unreasonably dangerous to the user is liable for physical
harm caused to the user, even though the seller was not negligent and
even though he was not in privity with the user. This approach was
first proposed in that form by Dean Prosser in the Yale Law Journal
and first adopted judicially by judge Traynor in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc.4 Since then, it has been enthusiastically adopted
by most courts that have had the chance, and it promises to carry the
day. Its main appeal is that it appears to be a tidier piece of legal
doctrine than its predecessors and it produces a social result that liberal
jurisprudes applaud.
The main 'feature of section 402A is that it makes a seller, whether
manufacturer or distributor, directly liable to the consumer for physical
harm irrespective of the existence of privity. But it is noncommittal on
liability to a bystander, liability for products that are changed by others
before they reach the consumer, and liability for defective component
parts.
Most lawyers would probably agree that the section reaches a defen-
sible social result. What is not so clear is how the tort liability envisaged
3. 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203, 206 (1959).
4. 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1962).
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by this section differs, if at all, from the tort liability flowing from a
breach of implied warranty.
The substantive differences, if any, are less significant than the dif-
ferences in language would seem to suggest. The implied warranty of
merchantability is couched in terms of a standard of quality that the
seller is expected to meet. In safety terms, this means that the product
must not injure the consumer. Section 402A, on the other hand, tells
us that the seller will be liable if his product is unreasonably dangerous
as a result of being defective. Because the standard of compliance
with the safety aspects of merchantability is the exact converse of the
standard of noncompliance envisaged by section 402A, there appears
to be no significant difference in the two standards of safety. Each
creates a general obligation of quality and each creates it with reference
to a sale of personal property. Both are said to carry the flavor of
tort. The most important difference, apparently, is that section 402A
does not use the word "warranty."
In view of the substantive similarities, it is not surprising that some
courts have found these two approaches substantively the same. In
Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co.5 the federal district court for the
Northern District of Indiana said, "This warranty imposed by law,
irrespective of privity and based on public policy, is more aptly called
'strict liability'.... .If the Restatement correctly states the conditions
of recovery now in practice, let those elements have a fresh name.
This judgment echoes that of a New York court in Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp.,", where, in referring to the "strict tort liability"
invoked in the Yuba case, the court described it as "surely a more
accurate phase." Neither court suggested any difference in substance.
A local federal judge recently wrote me as follows: ". . . the distinc-
tion between these theories is more academic than real. I have almost
concluded that while under the Federal Rules a plaintiff is entitled
to go to the juLy on several alternative theories, it is not proper to
submit the same cause on both theories of implied warranty and strict
liability." This view is supported by the fact that almost all the
precedent that the authors of section 402A relied on to support the
section involved breach of implied warranty. Had section 402A been
a new breed of cat, it would hardly have belonged in a "restatement"
of the law.
Not all courts agree. Influenced no doubt by the widely different
wording used, many apparently reject the notion that section 402A is
5. 237 F. Supp. 427, 431-433 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
6. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
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simply a rose under another name; they perceive attendant differences
in substance. This is strongly implied in Long v. Flanigan Warehouse
Co.,7 where the Nevada Supreme Court said that, although its reading
of the Uniform Sales Act ruled out a privity-exempt warranty running
directly to the consumer, the Act did not necessarily rule out the strict
tort liability approach taken by the California Supreme Court in the
Yuba case, later codified in section 402A.
Similar implications appear in Suvada v. White Motor Co., s in which
the court said that its reliance on strict tort liability made it unnecessary
to consider the possible effect of the Uniform Commercial Code. Such
notions also inhere in judicial statements that the stric-t tort liability
approach is free of any substantive limitations (such as privity, dis-
claimer, and notice) that the Uniform Sales Act or the Uniform Com-
mercial Code may have imposed on its counterparts in implied war-
ranty. If these cases are sound, we have two streams of liability with
different consequences and not merely one operating under two names.
Comment m to section 402A says that even if we call the responsibility
"warranty" it "is a very different kind of warranty." It "must be given
a new and different meaning if it is to be used in connection with
this section."
There may be still another legal- approach to protecting the consumer.
This is expressed in section 402B of the Restatement, recently adopted
by the Tennessee Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon.9 This section
bears the same general relationship to the express warranty of quality
as section 402A bears to the implied warranty of merchantability.
Section 402B provides,
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who . . . makes
to the public a misrepresentation of material fact concerning the
character or quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability
for physical harm to a consumer of the chattel caused by justi-
fiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though (a) it is
not made fraudulently or negligently, and (b) the consumer has
not bought the chattel from, or entered into any contractual
relationship with, the seller.
Here, too, the question arises: Is this simply a kind of privity-free
express warranty obligation that is expressed in differing terms, or is it
a separate counterpart with different substantive consequences? The
Lonon case suggests the latter. The issues and their importance are
the same as those already discussed.
7. 79 Nev. 241, 382 P.2d 399, 402 (1963).
8. 32 I1.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
9. 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966).
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So much for the alternative approaches to liability. Let us turn
now to the notorious issue of privity. Briefly, the privity requirement
says that consumer Smith cannot sue manufacturer Rogers for breach
of a contract (including breach of Warranty) unless the deal was between
those two people. In other words, a consumer who has been hurt by
a defective product cannot sue the manufacturer if he bought it from a
retailer. At one time, the consumer could not sue the manufacturer
even if the manufacturer had been downright careless. But ever since
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.10 the privity requirement in negligence
cases has been a dead letter in most states. In Indiana, strangely enough,
the official funeral was conducted only five years ago by J. I. Case Co.
v. Sandefur."
In warranty suits, on the other hand, the privity requirement re-
tained most of its vitality and even today is to be reckoned with in some
states. What was the basis for the privity requirement? Originally,
it made a lot of sense, particularly in the kind of sales transaction that
once prevailed: the casual, isolated transaction that took place between
two farmers in the simple sale of a horse, where the seller had no reason
to an.ticipate or be concerned with any transaction beyond that with
the immediate buyer. If the buyer later resold the horse, that was
likely to be a wholly independent and unrelated transaction. That
each sale was a self-contained and isolated unit made the privity require-
ment a plausible doctrine.
Whether or not the privity requirement was written into the Uni-
form Sales Act, expressly or impliedly, has been the subject of some
conflict. Cases like Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola Bottling Co.12 and Long
v. Flanigan Warehouse Co.13 found that the language of the Act (espe-
cially in the introductory clause and clause 1 of section 15) expressed
a legislative intention to confine the implied warranties to -those ex-
pressed by the Act and to limit their benefits to the immediate buyer.
Cases like Chapman v. Brown,14 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.,1 5 and Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co.,1 6 found otherwise.
In any event, the social and economic assumptions that underlay the
development of the privity doctrine no longer prevail. Today, the
manufacturer knows, when he sells to a primary distributor, wholesaler,
10. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
11. 245 Ind. 213, 197 N.E.2d 519 (1964).
12. 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125, 127 (1942).
13. 79 Nev. 241, 382 P.2d 399, 402 (1963).
14. 198 F. Supp. 78, 98 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
15. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 80-84, 99-102 (1960).
16. 237 F. Supp. 427, 431-433 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
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or retailer, where the goods are ultimately going and he is equally in-
terested in seeing that they get there. The manufacturer's knowledge
of and interest in the ultimate consumer is reflected in the patterns of
distribution, direct advertising appeals, and the ways goods are packed
or packaged. No longer can it be assumed -that the manufacturer's
sale to his immediate purchaser has no functional relationship with later
transactions involving the same goods.
Not only have the economic assumptions of the privity requirement
largely disappeared, but strong affirmative arguments can be advanced
to show that the privity requirement, in addition to being unnecessary,
is also unwise. One practical argument in the "vertical" privity cases
(lack of privity in the chain of distribution) is that in substance the
manufacturer is already strictly liable to the consumer through a series
of conventional warranty actions whereby the consumer collects from
the retailer, who collects from the wholesaler, who collects from the
manufacturer. This being the case, why not save time and money by
letting the consumer-buyer sue the manufacturer directly? This is the
argument against circuity.
A second argument is that direct suit is necessary to prevent practical
inequities existing in cases involving problems of "horizontal" privity
(lack of privity with users other than the consumer-buyer). For example,
if a guest in a home is injured under circumstances in which only the
retailer is implicated, the guest is a sure loser unless he can recover
against the retailer for breach of warranty. (Certainly, he cannot col-
lect from his host.) The conventional suit for negligence is out, because
the retailer has only rarely been negligent.
A third argument for doing away with the privity requirement, so
far as it insulates -the manufacturer, is that focusing financial pressure
on him tends to sharpen his general incentive to improve the product.
This argument has been accepted by most courts. Practically, it makes
sense.
The fourth argument for direct responsibility in warranty is that in
suits involving defects in manufacture, as distinct from defects in design,
the traditional negligence suit has provided relief only by pretending
to try an issue of fault that in most cases is inherently untriable because
neither party has direct evidence of what happened in the particular
case. Because fault has had to be inferred or presumed from a bare
showing of causation, there has been no significant evidentiary differ-
ence between a successful action based on alleged negligence and a suc-
cessful action based on a breach of implied warranty. This is the argu-
ment against unnecessary fictions.
The general policy arguments for strict liability, which is facilitated
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by doing away with the privity requirement, have in the view of some
writers coalesced into a principle of "enterprise" liability, the gist of
which is that a commercial enterprise should, as an expense of doing
business, provide compensation to those injured as a result of unavoid-
able risks incident to its operations. Presumably, such costs can be
passed on to the general run of consumers in the form of higher prices.
The general logic of doing away with the privity requirement has
been carrying -the day. The first statutory breach in the requirement
appeared in Connecticut, in the horizontal-privity situation. 17  This
statute allowed a member of the retailer buyer's household to sue the
retailer directly without having to show negligence. The same general
rule now appears in section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
On matters of vertical privity, on the other hand, the Code as enacted
in most states remains neutral. In 1957, the Georgia legislature enacted
a statute that in effect established a manufacturer's warranty of mer-
chantability that ran directly to the ultimate consumer.1 8  Recently,
Georgia and Virginia adopted versions of section 2-318 that provide
that lack of privity is no defense in a warranty or negligence suit
brought by one whom the seller should have expected to be a consumer.
So much for direct statutory attack.
In the meantime, the courts have been struggling on their own to
be rid of the privity requirement. A serious obstacle has been simple
stare decisis, and, in states where no statutory provisions were in force,
it has been the only obstacle. In some of the Sales Act states, another
obstacle has been the notion that the Act may have preempted the
field of implied warranty and, in so doing, recognized only warranties
running to the immediate buyer.
As usual, the courts have been resourceful. On the assumption that
the available warranties may have been limited to those listed in the
Uniform Sales Act, the first approach was to extend their benefits to
the ultimate consumer. This was expressed in theories that the statu-
tory warranties between the seller and his immediate buyer "ran with
the goods" or "inured" to the consumer's benefit, or that the consumer
was a "third party beneficiary." This approach was taken by section
2-318 of the Code.
Such an approach has been open to the theoretical but rarely recog-
nized objection that the consumer's rights could rise no higher than
those arising between the seller and his immediate buyer. This ap-
proach later yielded to the more realistic notion, reflected in section
17. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6630(1) (1949 Rev.)
18. GA. CODE ANN. § 96-307 (1958).
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402A, that, to avoid the hazards of disclaimer or other ills that might
infect the original transaction, what was really needed was an obligation
that ran directly to the consumer and was adequately tailored to his
needs. This has been called a "leaping warranty." Where the courts
took the trouble to reconcile their actions with the statute (which was
not often), it was accomplished by finding that, although the Uniform
Sales Act may have preempted the field of warranty obligations between
the seller and his immediate buyer, it did not preempt the field of
warranty obligation between the seller and third parties. This approach
made it possible for courts to create a special consumer warranty of their
own that was not only free of the privity requirement but exempt from
any requirement of notice. It was not until Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.,19 that the leaping warranty, which at first applied only
to food and drugs, was made to apply to products such as automobiles.
The neatest trick was turned by the California Supreme Court in
Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Company,20 which not only found the Uni-
form Sales Act no barrier to recovery but discovered in it an affirma-
tive legislative intent, in the case of food, to prescribe a direct responsi-
bility to the consumer. Its interpretative rationale remains obscure.
Most courts that dispense with the privity requirement have taken
considerable comfort from the notion that breach of warranty is more
tort than breach of contract, a notion that makes good sense in the
side-effect cases and those involving implied misrepresentation but
somewhat less sense in the cases in which the seller simply failed to
deliver what he agreed to. Unfortunately, a serious defect in the tort
clich6 is that for solving the problem that section 402A was mainly in-
tended to solve-how to avoid the reach of a possibly uncongenial Uni-
form Sales Act or Uniform Commercial Code-resolving the tort-con-
tract issue may have no material bearing on the issue of whether or not
either act pre-empted all or part of the field of quality obligation sur-
rounding a sale of goods.
It has long been debated whether specific statutory sales warranty
law carries a negative implication against quality obligations that run
in the first instance to persons other than the immediate buyer and,
if so, whether it also carries a negative implication against third-party
rights to participate in the enjoyment of quality obligations that run
in the first instance only to that buyer. The sole question, then, is one
of statutory interpretation. If under a proper interpretation of the
statute it is appropriate to attribute to it a design to establish an exclu-
19. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 80-84, 99-102 (1960).
20. 14 Cal.2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939).
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sive list of quality obligations relating to a sale of goods, it seems pro-
foundly irrelevant that a court might choose to characterize the viola-
tion of an obligation so excluded as "tort." Certainly, a proposed
obligation of quality attending a sale is no less an aspect of sales law
by being in tort. Nor is it any less such an aspect because the court
carefully avoids the unwholesome incantations "warranty" and "sales
law."
Of the many cases that ultimately found their way around the Uni-
form Sales Act, I know of only one that dealt in any professionally ac-
ceptable way with the specific language of the Act: Chapman v. Brown.
2 1
This was the hula skirt case. There the federal court for the District
of Hawaii gave some evidence of having actually read the Act. More
typical was the Arizona Supreme Court, which blithely dumped the
previously accepted privity requirement without so much as a nod to
the Uniform Sales Act.22 Even the landmark Henningsen case is a pretty
shoddy piece of judicial merchandise in this respect. In Greenberg v.
Lorenz, 23 the New York Court of Appeals found as an important sta-
tutory justification for repudiating the privity requirement the fact
that the Uniform Sales Act did not use the word "privity." Surely the
court that fathered MacPherson v. Buick could do better than that!
I am not saying that the Uniform Sales Act in effect imposed the
privity requirement. I am only saying that very few courts have ever
bothered to ascertain what the Act meant so that they could find out.
What about the Uniform Commercial Code? First, in section 2-318
it expressly abolishes the privity requirement in the great bulk of hori-
zontal privity situations: a member of the family or a guest in the
house (it says nothing about a commercial employee) can recover from
the retailer. Second, in comment 3 under that section, the Code pro-
claims its neutrality on the matter of vertical privity, thus passing the
buck to the courts. Third, there is no language in the Code, comparable
to the introductory clause of section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act, that
says that the implied warranties mentioned are the only ones permitted
by it. Does this mean that privity is no problem under the Code?
In Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp.24 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court found that the benefits of section 2-318 did not extend to an
employee of the buyer and thus barred him for want of privity, pre-
sumably because the Code preempted at least the field of horizontal
21. 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
22. Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P.2d 1094 (1957).
23. 9 N.Y.2d 195, 213 N.Y.S.2d, 39, 173 N.E.2d 771 (1961).
24. 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575, 577 (1963).
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privity. I do not know whether that interpretation is correct (the sec-
ond sentence of comment 3 is, in this respect, ambiguous) but, if it is,
a nice question arises whether the court might, instead, grant compara-
ble relief under section 402A of the Restatement of Torts.
Indeed, this precise question came before the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Webb v. Zern.2  In a capsule opinion, the court summarily
adopted section 402A in a situation in which neither a buyer nor a con-
sumer, but a bystanding son, was involved. The nearest thing to a
reason that the court gave was a passing reference to "the modern view"
as elucidated in Miller v. Preitz,-6 upholding Hochgertel amid a chorus
of concurrences and dissents sufficient to suggest several bases for Webb
v. Zern. Did Webb overrule Hochgertel in the area of warranty, or did
it leave Hochgertel theoretically intact by using section 402A to steer
around the area of warranty and a Uniform Commercial Code that the
court assumed to be uncongenial? It was probably the latter.
If there is a negative implication in the Code, can section 402A be
used as a practical expedient to circumvent it? If the cases I have
read are correct, the answer is yes. As a teacher of products liability,
I find this result socially desirable and just. As a teacher of legislation
and an amateur jurisprude, I find it unprofessional and even shocking.
There is a problem here only if section 402A creates something dif-
ferent from, and inconsistent with, quality obligations created by the
Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code. Although the
authors of section 402A claimed direct lineage from a series of warranty
cases that had done away with the privity requirement, the main moti-
vation for the section was to create a new and different product, vis-a-vis
privity, in any jurisdiction in which the privity requirement still showed
signs of life. The strategy was to throw the vast prestige of the American
Law Institute and the Restatement behind a movement designed to in-
fluence courts to line up with the new thought. One of the baits of-
fered was an allegedly simplified rule of law to replace what have
often been called the "intricacies of the law of sales." This is very
appealing and, on the basis of the returns so far, it has been received
with open arms. Courts that either did not understand those intricacies
or were impatient with them have leaped at the chance to conform.
Because the results are socially desirable, why raise questions at this
late date? I have several specific misgivings here even though, long
before Judge Traynor's decision in the Yuba case and long before Dean
25. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
26. 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
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Prosser's 1960 article in the Yale Law Journal,2 7 I was in print urging
the adoption of strict liability without privity restrictions.
My most serious misgiving about section 402A is that its adoption has
been urged, not merely in what were then common law states, but in
statutory states as a way of obtaining legal results that the authors of
the section assumed might otherwise be ruled out by the Uniform Sales
Act or the Uniform Commercial Code.
In such states, either the statute is an impediment to the adoption of
strict liability free of privity limitations or it is not. If it is not an
impediment, there is no problem and section 402A was unneeded. If
it is an impediment, the adoption of section 402A would impliedly
amend the statute. Specifically, this would be the case where the court,
like those in New Hampshire, Nevada, and Pennsylvania, believed that
the subject of the seller's responsibility for defective products had been
preempted by the Uniform Sales Act or its successor, the Uniform
Commercial Code.
The authors of section 402A would contend vehemently that section
402A does not try to make new law inconsistently with either of those
acts, but tries, rather, to steer around them. But how can you steer
around a statute simply by not characterizing your action by the terms
used in the statute? Can you avoid a larceny statute simply by calling
a permanent violation of possession by another name? I would have
thought that that kind of word magic had long since died. Comment rn
to the Restatement in effect answers, "OK; call it 'warranty,' if you like.
This is a different kind of warranty." But if it is warranty (it meets
all the established tests), how can a court justify it as such if by hypo-
thesis the court has already read the statute as preempting the field of
the seller's minimum obligations as to quality? Either section 402A is
unnecessary or it attempts the unconstitutional, judicial amendment of
an uncongenial statute.
The first court to fall into this trap was the Nevada Court in Long v.
Flanigan Warchonse Co.28 Having said that the Uniform Sales Act,
in requiring privity, preempted the field of warranty obligation, it went
on to say that it might later entertain a direct action in strict tort liability
under the Yuba approach, apparently without realizing that the seller's
quality obligation that it recognized might be substantively indis-
tinguishable from warranty.
27. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
28. 79 Nev. 241, 382 P.2d 399, 403 (1963).
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The problem here affects not only the matter of privity but those of
notice, disclaimer and statute of limitations.
Again, I have not said that section 402A is in fact inconsistent with
the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code. (A hard look
at the Code may well show this to be the case.) I have merely said
that there may be a problem of statutory interpretation here and, if so,
the courts ought to face up to it in the way the federal district court
faced up to it in Chapman v. Brown. It is not merely that the courts
may be misinterpreting these acts; they are not even recognizing that
an interpretative question may arise when a common law rule is
introduced into an area where a statute already exists.
In Suvada v. White Motor Car Co.,29 the Illinois Court was induced
by the absence of the word "warranty" to say, "Our holding of strict
liability in tort makes it unnecessary to decide what effect section 2-318
has on an action for breach of implied warranty." On the contrary, if
the two kinds of obligation differ only in name, it is necessary to see
what backlash, if any, is wielded by that section of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. This can be ascertained only by ascertaining (1) whether
the statute carries such an implication, (2) what kinds of seller's quality
obligations it relates to, and (3) whether this "different kind of war-
ranty" is one of the kinds impliedly so proscribed. The problem is
already being compounded as courts extend section 402A or 402B to
cover commercial loss. 3 0 Add enough 402's and we can neutralize the
Code altogether!
This general trend makes me wonder whether there isn't material
here for an article called How to Amend a Statute Without Really
Trying. Although I like the substance of the rule stated in section
402A, the use of it suggested by comment m leads me to ask why its use
to circumvent possibly uncongenial sales statutes was urged and so
successfully. Having rejected the implausible explanation that Dean
Prosser, Judge Traynor, and other members of the judiciary are either
stupid or intellectually dishonest, I have come to rest with the only
29. 32 111.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182, 187-188 (1965).
30. E.g., Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965).
A court that applies section 402A without taking account of the Code is default-
ing on its constitutional responsibility to respect the legislative will. That
some judges are willing to derogate from statutory limitations on implied war-
ranty even intentionally is suggested by Justice Peters' dissent in Seely v. White
Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 29, 403 P.2d 145, 157 (1965): "I am not concerned
over the fact that if damages on the strict liability theory are allowed here,
this may limit the application of some of the restrictive statutory provisions
relating to warranty." For several areas of possible conflict, see Rapson, Products
Liability under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial
Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTCERS L. REv. 692, 704-711 (1965).
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other explanation that makes sense to me: Most American lawyers and
judges simply have never learned how to deal with statutes. Having
been brainwashed in a system that still puts the courts at the top of
the legal order, they either ignore statutes or treat them as if they stood
no higher than case law. Indeed, the whole trend beginning with Yuba
and section 402A makes beautiful sense if we assume that courts may
treat statutes similarly to cases. But how can we square such an assump-
tion with the tripartite system of separating legislative from judicial
and executive powers that has been adopted by every American consti-
tution?
Examination of the Pennsylvania cases also leads one to wonder
whether the speed-up of judicial conversions that section 402A has pro-
duced will turn out to be worth the doctrinal confusion that it is pro-
ducing in the courts and law journals. Henningsen and especially
Chapman had already given us a workable approach for doing away
with privity, and it would be ironical if the impatience underlying sec-
tion 402A and the consequent disregard of statutory sales law turned
out to set products liability doctrine back a dozen years instead of ad-
vancing it.
I make this prediction: Much of the apparently greater simplicity of
doctrine that section 402A purports to offer will disappear when the
-courts face up to some of the problems involving special arrangements
between the manufacturer and his immediate seller, not all of which
can be written off as bald "disclaimer." More of this simplicity will
disappear when the courts face up to the three problems, mentioned
earlier, that the section now ducks. The problems of causation, special
arrangements and expectations, warning, and plaintiff's contribution to
the harm will not go away even if we pretend that these intricacies
belong to sales and not to tort law. So much for section 402A!
Another approach to privity is to admit that there is a privity
requirement, but argue that with modern methods of packaging, adver-
tising, and distribution the requirement is in fact satisfied. The manu-
facturer's pitch in most cases is made directly to the consumer and the
consumer so understands. 3 1
Now that we can almost say a final good-by to the privity require-
ment, what important elements of products liability remain?
Almost every legal issue in this field can now be subsumed under a
simple formulation, whether we talk warranty or not: Strict liability
equals causation plus a legal defect. The formula works, so far as the
31. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828, 832 (1942).
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matter of proof is concerned, also for negligence suits involving defects
in manufacture. The only element that might not fit comfortably within
this pattern is individual assumption of risk.
When we examine what constitutes a legal defect, we also find that
strict liability may not be as "strict" as it may have seemed. The gist
of product defectiveness is a condition that carries a risk of harm not
normally anticipated and guarded against by the consumer. This ex-
plains why trichinous pork is not necessarily defective (the consumer
normally expects to cook it sufficiently), while a chicken bone in a
chicken sandwich may be. The key idea here is to protect the normal
safety expectations of the typical consumer of that kind of product.
The consumer's reasonable expectations may be frustrated in several
ways:
(1) The product may fail to perform the function that it is sup-
posed to perform (brakes that fail).
(2) The product may create the very danger that it is supposed
to guard against (polio vaccine that causes polio).
(3) While adequately performing its intended function, a pro-
duct may have a bad unanticipated side effect (emphysema
from smoking cigarettes).
(4) It may fail to minimize partly avoidable consequences in case
of an accident (car without a head rest).
Consumer expectations relate both to the kind of use that the con-
surmer makes of the product and, respecting such a use, to the minimum
level of performance. Suppose that, while a consumer is standing on an
apparently sturdy chair, it collapses and he breaks his leg. Or suppose
lie uses a wire rope for purposes for which a hemp rope is ordinarily
used. In either case, does the consumer have reasonable expectations
that the law should try to protect? The answer depends on what normal
people do normally. I suspect that the consumer might have a cause
of action in the case of the chair,3 2 but not in the case of the wire
rope.. In the latter case, he may be expected to know that wire rope
is subject to special crimping hazards when its folds are not protected
by the contours of a wheel or other curved surface.
Assinming that the consumer's use is an accepted one, what level of
performance should be legally assured? How long is it reasonable to
expect an automobile tire to last? What kind of performance can
reasonably be expected of used or reconditioned goods? Here, again,
reasonable consumer expectations provide a valuable general guide,
32. Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App.2d 650, 654, 235 P.2d
857, 859 (1951).
33. Mannsz v. MacWhyte, 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946).
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because they measure the degree of his reliance on the seller and thus
the extent of his vulnerability.
The most troublesome situations are those in which consumer atti-
tudes have not sufficiently jelled to define an expected standard of per-
formance. What, for example, should the law do about tractors that
overturn, surgical implants that break, and rear engined automobiles that
tend to swerve at high speeds? That it is hard to measure consumer ex-
pectations precisely does not invalidate the general approach. Fortu-
nately, problems of this kind are common grist for the courts; a judg-
ment defining specific patterns of consumer expectation for a particular
product is a familiar exercise in judicial empathy.
What about the reasonable expectations of the seller? These, too,
are taken into account.
On the one hand, it is reasonable to expect a toy manufacturer to
know that children put toys in their mouths and, accordingly, to make
sure that there is no arsenic in the paint he uses. On the other, it has
been held that, because the manufacturers of steel casement windows had
no reason to know that workmen on building construction projects were
using unglazed windows as ladders, such a manufacturer was not liable
if a steel mullion happened to break while it was being so used.3 4
Other seller expectations have also been protected. For example,.
the manufacturer of an unfinished product who sells it to one on
whom he can reasonably rely to finish it has been held not liable to the
ultimate consumer if his buyer resold the product without completing
the contem1plated processing.
3 5
The big unresolved problem in the area of legal defectiveness appears
in cases involving adverse side effects resulting from defective design.
Suppose a product (cigarettes) work well for its intended purpose
(smoking), but has an unforeseen and devastating side effect (cancer).
Should the seller be held accountable on the ground that he was sold a
"defective" product? The answer is clearly yes, if the side effect could
reasonably have been anticipated by his kind of seller. This is standard
negligence law.
What about strict liability? The seller will also be liable where, al-
though the risk may be unknown to the industry generally, it is known
to scientists. But suppose the risk is unknown even to scientists. Here
the cases split. Lartigue v. R. .1. Reynolds Tobacco Co.36 said that a
cigarette manufacturer is not liable for the unforeseen side effect of can-
34. McCreadv v. United Iron and Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1959).
35. Schneider v. Suhrrnann, 8 Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822 (1958).
36. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
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cer if even scientists could not have foreseen it. Green v. American
Tobacco Co.,3 7 on the other hand, held that under Florida law the
seller's knowledge or opportunity for knowledge is irrelevant, period.
The argument for the former view is that it encourages the manu-
facturer to keep abreast of scientific developments. The argument for
the latter is that it encourages hint to help extend the frontiers of sci-
ence itself. An argument against it is that it may discourage new, needed
products.
So far as I know, this controversy does not extend to products that
disappoint consumer expectations by failing to perform as both parties
reasonably expect. Thus, the manufacturer of an airplane is liable
if its wings fall off, even though the best scientists available have given
it a clean bill of health.
In the field of legal defect, it is useful to distinguish defects of
design, which contaminate a whole product, from defects resulting from
slips in manufacture, which affect only particular items. For example,
a design feature is often hard to characterize as legally defective, whereas
a deviant item is labeled by its very abnormality.
For defects in design, where a real issue of negligence is often triable,
strict liability as applied in the side-effect (including allergy) cases is,
under the Lartigue approach, only one short step from negligence. The
only difference I can perceive is that in negligence the standard of know-
how that is attributed to the seller is the industry's, whereas, in the
Lartigue version of so-called strict liability, the standard of know-how
is the laboratory scientist's. In this particular area, the net advantages
achieved by section 402A seem minimal.
For defects in manufacture, on the other hand, liability is almost
necessarily strict liability even if the suit is formally in negligence, sim-
ply because it is rarely possible to show what went wrong in the specific
case. Culpability can only be inferred from causation.
The subject of legal defect is much too complicated to cover ade-
quately here. For some of the refinements, the reader may want to
look at an article specially devoted to the subject. 38
Unfortunately, the symmetry of this introduction to products liabil-
ity is impaired by my failure to leave enough room for the other major
issue in any products liability suit: that of causation. Here, two big
steps are involved. First, the plaintiff must trace his hurt to the defend-
ant's product, which may take some doing if the reaction has been
37. 150 So.2d 169 (Flak. 1963).
38. The most recent one is Dickerson, How Good Does a Product Have To Be?,
42 IND. L.J. 301 (1967).
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delayed or diffused. Second, he must trace the offending condition
back far enough to show that it existed in the product when the defend-
ant let go of it. This, too, may take some doing if there has been any
significant chance of intermediate meddling or other intervening cause.
Because he has the burden of proof, the plaintiff must theoretically
exclude the latter contingency. Fortunately, most courts have been
satisfied if he reduces it to a relative improbability. Both on the issue
of defectiveness and that of causation, adequate expert witnesses may
be crucial.
And then there are special problems such as disclaimer, notice, trans-
actions other than sales, bystanders, statutes of limitations, damages,
conflict of laws, and insurance. As for the plaintiff's own possible con-
tribution to the injury, disqualification may result, depending on parti-
cular circumstances, tunder at least five different legal doctrines: contri-
butory negligence, assumption of risk, non-contemplated use, lack of
causation, and avoidable consequences.
Although I solemnly promised to cover all of products liability in
the short span allotted me, it must be apparent that I have not made
good on that promise. I have even oversimplified the few topics that I
covered. But if there is some inkling here of the kinds of subtleties and
complications that permeate this living area of the law, perhaps the
effort has not been misspent.
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